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Abstract—In traditional distributed computing the users and
owners of the computational resources usually belong to the
same administrative domain. Therefore all users are equally en-
titled to use the resources. The situation is completely different
in large-scale emergent distributed computing systems, such as
Grid systems, where the roles of the users are asymmetric as
regards their access rights and usage of resources. Further,
unlike traditional distributed computing case, Grid systems
introduce hierarchical levels, which are to be taken into account
for optimizing the overall system’s performance. In this paper
we present a Stackelberg game for modelling asymmetric users’
behavior in Grid scheduling scenario. We define a two-level
game with a Leader at the first level and the rest of users,
called Followers, at the second one. The Leader is responsible
for computing a planning of his tasks, which is usually a large
fraction of the total pool of tasks in the batch. The Followers
try to select the best strategy for the assignments of their tasks
subject to Leader’s strategy. The Stackelberg game is then
translated into a hierarchical optimization problem, which is
solved by Genetic Algorithm (GA) on the Leader’s level and
by ad hoc heuristic combined with GA on the Followers’ level.
We have experimentally evaluated the approach through a
benchmark of static instances and report computational results
for resource utilization, makespan and flowtime.
Keywords-Computational Grid, Stackelberg game, Schedul-
ing, Makespan, Flowtime, Resource utilization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Grid systems are large-scale distributed systems built up
using resources from different institutions, enterprises and/or
particular owners. The cross-domain is thus one of the most
important features of Grid systems. Due to this feature, the
Grid users have different access rights to resources and they
stand in an asymmetric position with regard to resource
usage privileges. The asymmetric behavior of Grid users
directly impacts the scheduling process.
In this paper we define a Stackelberg game to model
the Grid users’ behavior. We use this model for find-
ing near-optimal solutions of the problem of independent
batch scheduling in Grid systems. The Stackelberg games
have been well-studied in the game theory literature (see,
e.g. [Bac¸sar and Olsder, 1995]). Roughgarden [Roughgar-
den, 2001] defined a Stackelberg game model for scheduling
tasks on a set of machines with load-dependent latencies in
order to minimize the total latency of the system.
In our Stackelberg game scenario, one of the users acts as
a Leader and the rest are his Followers. The Leader may hold
his strategy fixed while the followers react independently
subject to the Leader’s strategy. There are actually many
real-life Grid scenarios in which this game model can
characterize situations where there is a Leader who acts first.
Some such scenarios can be defined as follows:
• There is a privileged user (Leader), who can have a full
access to resources as opposed to the other users who
can be granted only limited access to resources.
• Considering a pool of tasks, the Leader could be the
owner of a large portion of the tasks in the pool; it
might then seem reasonable to allocate his tasks in the
best resources in the system.
• Some tasks could have critical deadlines (for example
in real-time scheduling). Then a Leader would first
send the information of these tasks to the meta-broker
requesting to allocate them first.
• Some tasks could have security requirements. Then the
Leader can send the information of these tasks to the
meta-broker requesting to allocate them in the most
trustful resources (secure machines).
• Tasks arriving at a Grid system could be disparate in
their needs for computational resources. Some of them
could be atomic tasks generated by compound tasks
while the others could be just monolithic applications.
The high degree of heterogeneity of tasks is the crucial
factor conditioning the Grid system’s performance. In
such a scenario the Leader could create a small batch
of the most time consuming tasks, out the task pool,
in order to “balance” the disparity. These tasks would
then be sent to the meta-broker requesting to allocate
them first.
It can be seen that the selection of the Leader’s initial
strategy in the game is crucial for the Followers’ action. We
focus in this paper on the second scenario presented above.
The users’ Stackelberg game can be analyzed as a two-
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level hierarchical optimization problem where the Leader
optimizes his cost function based on Followers’ rational
behavior. For solving the game we have designed three
hybrid meta-heuristics combining Genetic Algorithms (GA)
at Leader’s and Followers’levels and three well-known ad-
hoc scheduling methods at Followers’ level, namely Min-
Min, Max-min and Sufferage. The proposed game model has
been then evaluated through a static benchmark of instances
and three basic metrics, namely average resource utilization,
makespan and flowtime are evaluated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Sect. II we define a Grid meta-broker model and recall some
preliminary concepts of independent task batch scheduling.
We define the game model and describe the Stackelberg
game scenario for Grid users in Sect. III. In Sect. IV three
hybrid GA-based schedulers for solving the users’ game are
introduced. A preliminary experimental evaluation using a
static benchmark is presented in Sect. V. In Sect.VI we
conclude the paper and discuss future research directions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System model
Computational Grid, as a large-scale distributed comput-
ing platform, is usually modelled as a hierarchical system for
an effective management of tasks and resources. In [Kwok
et al., 2007] the hierarchy consists of three levels: the
global scheduling level, the inter-site level, and the intra-
site level. In the Meta-broker models (see e.g. [Garg et al.,
2009]) just two levels are defined: there is a centralized
job manager (meta-broker) responsible for controlling the
resource allocation and communication between consumers
(users), and service providers (resource owners). In this
work we adapted this model to define a possible Grid
infrastructure where the users play asymmetric roles in their
community. One of the users is acting as a Leader, who
usually controls a significant fraction of the task pool over
time and can define (and send to the meta-broker as the
requests) some preferences in scheduling. The remaining
users, the Followers, follow the Leader’s action and try to
select strategies to optimize their game cost functions.
A general idea of a simple meta-broker model of Grid
site with the Leader in user’s community is presented in
Fig. 1. In this model there are several independent users
(Followers in a game scenario) submitting their own tasks
to the Grid site. Note that we assume here the centralized
version of the scheduling. In the decentralized version there
are defined different groups of users , each of them having
its own Leader.
We consider in this work the Independent Task Scheduling
problem, in which tasks are processed in batch mode [Xhafa
et al., 2007 c)]. For modelling the scheduling problem, we
use the Expected Time to Compute model [Ali et al., 2000]
with the following instance data, which has to be provided:
Figure 1. The meta-broker model of Grid site with one user acting as a
Leader and the rest of users as its Followers.
• the estimation of computational load of each task
(e.g. in millions of instructions);
• the computing capacity of each machine (e.g. in mil-
lions of instructions per second, MIPS);
• the estimation of the prior load of each available
machine;
• the ETC matrix, in which ETC[t][r] indicates the
expected time to compute the task t in resource the
r.
III. STACKELBERG GAME FOR GRID USERS
An N -persons Stackelberg game can be defined as two-
level game where the players act sequentially as follows.
On the first level only the Leader is active, who chooses his
strategy for a portion of task pool in the batch. Then, on a
second level, the Followers, react rationally to the Leader’s
move. It means that they try to minimize their game cost
functions for their own tasks subject to the Leader’s choice.
Finally, the Leader updates his strategy to minimize the total
cost of the game.
The general Stackelberg game scenario can be used to
model the asymmetric Grid users’ behavior.
A. General game scenario
To define the Stackelberg game for the Grid users let us
introduce the following notation:
• N is the number of users;
• n is the total number of tasks in a batch, that is, the
sum of tasks submitted by all users: n =
∑N
l=1 kl,
where kl is the number of tasks submitted by the user
l : l = 1, . . . , N ;
• {J1, . . . , JN}; l = 1, . . . , N are the sets of strategies of
the users. We assume that J1 is the set of the Leader’s
strategies. Note that a strategy is essentially a schedule
of tasks to available machines.
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• α denotes the portion of the tasks pool owned by
Leader, i.e. α = card(J1), where card(X) denotes the
number of elements of a set X;
• x1 = [x1, . . . , xk1 ] ∈ J1 for k1 = n · α is the Leader’s
strategy vector;
• xl = [xkl−1+1, . . . , xkl ] : l = 2, . . . , N where k2+. . .+
kN = (1− α) · n are the Followers’ strategy vectors;
• {Q1, . . . , QN};Ql : J1 × . . . × JN →
R
+;∀l = 1, . . . , N is the set of users’ game cost
functions.
The Stackelberg game for the users could be then defined
as follows:
• Leader’s Level: Leader’s action I - Leader chooses
his initial strategy. His strategy vector x̂1 =
[x̂1, . . . , x̂k1 ] represents Leader’s initial action.
• Followers’ Level: Followers’ action - Each Follower
minimizes his cost function relative to the Leader’s
strategy:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
x2F = argminx2∈J2 {Q2(x̂1, x2, . . . , xN )}
.
.
.
xNF = argminxN∈JN {QN (x̂1, . . . , xN )}
(1)
Let us denote by xF = [x̂1, x2F , . . . , xNF ] the vector
which is interpreted as the result of the Followers’
action.
• Leader’s Level: Leader’s action II - Leader updates
his strategy by minimizing his cost function Ql tak-
ing into account the result of Followers’ action. The
following vector xG = [xL, x2F , . . . , xNF ], where:
xL = arg min
x1∈J1
Q(x1, x2F , . . . , x
N
F ) (2)
is a solution of the whole game.
Note that the Followers play an ”ordinary” non-
cooperative game, but they must know the Leader’s action
first. An optimal solution of the whole game is called
Stackelberg Equilibrium.
B. Users’ cost functions
The user’s cost function Ql, introduced in Section III-A,
is defined on the set of all possible schedules Sched =
J1 × . . . × JN . A schedule of tasks submitted by all users
at the Grid site is expressed as a vector x = [x1, . . . , xN ],
where xl = [xkl−1+1, . . . , xkl ] denotes an l-th user’s strategy
vector, in which xj ∈ [1,m] indicates the number of the
machine, to which task j is allocated (j = kl−1+1, . . . , kl).
In our approach the user cost Ql of playing a Stackelberg
game can be defined as the sum of the following two
components:
Ql = Q
(e)
l +Q
(u)
l , (3)
where:
• Q(e)l indicates user’s task execution cost,
• Q(u)l denotes resource utilization cost calculated for a
given user.
Each Grid user l submits a set of kl independent tasks. The
total cost of the execution of the tasks belonged to the user l
can be calculated as an average completion time of execution
of all his tasks on machines, to which they are allocated. We
can then define function Q(e)l using the following formulae:
Q
(e)
l =
∑kl
j=kl−1+1 completion[j][xj ]
completionm · kl , (4)
where completions[j][xj ] denotes the completion time of a
task j on machine xj and it is calculated in the following
way:
completions[j][xj ] = ETC[j][xj ] + ready[xj ]. (5)
We denoted by completionm in Eq. 4 the maximal
completion time of the user’s tasks, i.e :
completionm = max
j=kl−1+1,...,kl
completion[j][xj ]. (6)
Note that in Eqs. (4) and (5) ETC[j][xj ] is an element of
the ETC matrix and ready[xj ] is the finishing time of the
execution of tasks previously assigned to the machine xj .
The second component of Ql, denoted by Q(u)l , refers to
the utility function in Grid system, which is usually defined
as the cost of the resource utilization. For instance, in [Garg
et al., 2009] the utilization cost is calculated for the Grid
users as the cost of buying free CPU cycles. In our approach
each user tends to minimize his “portion” of a price for the
idle time units of machines on which his tasks are executed.
We define the Q(u)l function using the following expression:
Q
(u)
l =
∑
xj∈machines(l)
(
1− Completion(l)[xj ]
loc makespan
)
· P [xj ]
(7)
where machines(l) denotes a set of machines, to which
all tasks of the user l are assigned. We denote by
loc makespan the local makespan which is defined as the
maximal completion time of all machines. The comple-
tion time of the machine xj ∈ machines(l), denoted by
Completion(l)[xj ], is calculated in the following way:
Completion(l)[xj ] = ready[xj ] +
∑
p∈{1,...,n}:
x[p]=xj
ETC[p][xj ]
(8)
where x[p] is the value of p-th coordinate in a given schedule
vector x.
The fraction:
Completion(l)[xj ]
loc makespan
(9)
in Eq. (7) is interpreted as the cost of utilization of machine
xj . The fraction of the cost of the idle time of machine xj
calculated for a given user l is defined by:
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(
1− Completion(l)[xj ]
loc makespan
)
· P [xj ], (10)
where:
P [xj ] =
∑
j∈Tasks(l)[xj ] ETC[j][xj ]
Completion(l)[xj ]
(11)
and Tasks(l)[xj ] is the set of the tasks of the user l assigned
to the machine xj . The fraction P [xj ] expresses a relative
time of execution of all tasks of the user l assigned to the
machine xj (with respect to the completion time of the
machine xj).
It follows from Eq. (7) that the utilization cost1 is minimal
in the case of allocation of the user’s tasks to machines
with the maximal completion time. It means that the main
resource utilization criterion is satisfied.
IV. GA-BASED HYBRID SCHEDULERS FOR SOLVING THE
GRID USERS’ GAME
The problem of solving the Stackelberg game can be
formulated as a hierarchical two-level optimization problem.
Once the Leader chooses his strategy, we have to minimize,
at the Followers’ level, the Followers’ cost functions (see
Eq. (1)). Then, the Leader’s solution as specified by Eq. (2)
is calculated at the Leader’s level.
To solve this hierarchic optimization problem, we pro-
pose three Hybrid GA-based Schedulers, where GA at
Leader’s and Followers’ levels is hybridized with three ad-
hoc scheduling heuristics, namely Min-Min, Max-min and
Sufferage. We denote the resulting hybrid algorithms by GA-
MinMin, Ga-MaxMin and GA-Sufferage, respectively. The
general template of that GA-based scheduler at the Leader’s
level is given in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1 A hybridized GA-based scheduler template -
Leader’s level
1: Generate P 0 containing μ “incomplete” schedules; t = 0;
2: Send P 0 to the Followers to complete the respective parts of all
schedules in P 0 (using ad-hoc heuristics); P 0(F ) is created;
3: Update the population P 0 according to the Followers’ solutions;P 0 :=
P 0(F );
4: Evaluate P 0;
5: while not termination-condition do
6: Select the parental pool T t of size λ; T t := Select(P t);
7: Perform crossover procedures separately on Leader’s and Follow-
ers’variables on pairs of individuals in T t(F ) with probability pc;
P tc := Cross(T
t);
8: Perform mutation procedures separately to Leader’s and Followers’
variables on individuals in P tc with probability pm; P tm :=
Mutate(P tc );
9: Evaluate P tm ;
10: Create a new population P t+1 of size μ from individuals in P t
and P tm ; P t+1 := Replace(P t;P tm)
11: t := t + 1;
12: end while
13: return Best found individual as solution;
1The utilization cost for the user l is expressed in arbitrary time units.
The process of initialization of the population in our
hybrid GA is defined as a two-steps procedure. In the
first step we define P 0 as a candidate initial population.
It consists of the incomplete schedules computed by the
Leader using one of the initialization methods for GA-
based schedulers (see e.g. [Xhafa et al., 2007 a)]). Each
schedule from this set contains just the values of the Leader’s
decision variables. All those “incomplete” chromosomes are
sent to the Followers, who fill in the respective parts of
each schedule by using one of the ad-hoc heuristics. The
updated P 0 is then evaluated under the game cost function
Q =
∑
l=1...N Ql defined as the fitness. The crossover and
mutation operations are performed separately on Leader’s
and Followers’ decision variables. Thus in each generation
the Followers can update their own decision (including the
initial choices) due to possible changes on availability of
resources introduced by the Leader.
Based on the results of the tuning process of GA operators
performed in [Xhafa et al., 2007 a)] we used linear ranking
selection, cycle crossover (CX) and re-balancing mutation as
an appropriate combination of such operators for our algo-
rithm. We also applied the elitist generational replacement
method and LJFR-SJFR (Longest Job to Fastest Resource
– Shortest Job to Fastest Resource) as the initialization
procedure of generating P 0 defined for the Leader.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS FOR STATIC SCHEDULING
The dynamic schedulers working in the batch mode run
the static methods for scheduling tasks sampled in particular
batches. Thus our preliminary experimental study has been
conducted on a subset of the benchmark of static instances.
Those instances are classified into different types of ETC
matrices, according to task heterogeneity, machine hetero-
geneity and consistency. Each instance consists of 512 tasks
and 16 machines and is labeled by u x yyzz.0 as in [Braun
et al., 2001] (in the notation, hi means high, and lo means
low):
• u means uniform distribution (used in generating the
matrix).
• x means the type of consistency (c–consistent, i–
inconsistent and s – semi-consistent).
• yy indicates the heterogeneity of the tasks.
• zz indicates the heterogeneity of the resources.
We perform our experiments for a representative group
of 17 Grid users with one selected as a Leader. The Leader
maintains the half of the whole task pool, i.e. 256 tasks. The
rest of the tasks in the pool is uniformly distributed among
16 Followers, i.e. each of them owns 16 tasks. In this study
we assume that Leader owns 50% of task pool (i.e. α = 0.5).
The settings of parameters is presented in Table I.
We set the base population size in GA on the Leader’s
level as 60 individuals, intermediate population size - 48, the
crossover and mutation probabilities are fixed to 0.8 and 0.3,
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Table I
GENERAL SIMULATION PARAMETER SETTING.
Parameter Value setting
Total number of tasks 512
Number of machines 16
Number of users 17
Leader’s fraction of task pool (α) 0.5
Number of tasks belonging to the Leader 256
Number of tasks belonging
to individual Follower 16
respectively. The algorithm has been stopped after executing
2000 generations.
Performance Metrics Evaluated: We used the follow-
ing three metrics for evaluating performance of the proposed
schedulers:
• Flowtime: Let Fj denotes the time when task j final-
izes. The flowtime can be calculated using the following
formulae:
Flowtime =
∑
j∈Task
Fj (12)
Flowtime is usually considered as a QoS criterion as
it expresses the response time to the submitted task
execution requests of Grid users.
• Makespan: Makespan is one of the basic metrics of
a Grid systems performance: the smaller the value
of makespan, the faster is the execution of tasks in
the Grid system. Makespan can be calculated by the
following formulae:
Makespan = max
j∈Tasks
Fj (13)
• Average Resource Utilization:
Avg utilization =
∑
i∈Machines completion[i]
makespan ·m
(14)
where m denotes number of machines, machines is the
set of all machines in a given batch and completion[i]
is a completion time of machine i and it is calculated
adapting the formulae of Eq. (8) for the whole schedule.
The aim of an optimal scheduling is to minimize both
flowtime and makespan and maximize the average re-
source utilization over the set of all possible schedules for
a Grid configuration.
A. Computational results
We present in Table II computational results obtained
for the static benchmark using the three meta-heuristic
implementations, denoted as in Section IV. In order to avoid
biased results, each experiment was repeated 30 times and
average values of three considered metrics are reported.
Analysis of the results: By analyzing the average flow-
time values we can observe that GA-MinMin outperforms
other algorithms in all but three instances, for which GA-
Sufferage works better. In the case of makespan GA-MinMin
outperforms two remaining meta-heuristics in 6 instances,
GA-Sufferage – in 5 instances and both metaheuristics are
worse than GA-MaxMin just in one case of high heterogene-
ity of machines for the consistent ETC matrix .
We can conclude that GA-MinMin is the most effective
in comparison with the remaining two GA-based hybrids in
the optimization of the flowtime. Only in two cases of low
heterogeneity of resources for the consistent ETC matrix and
in one case of high heterogeneity of resources and tasks for
the semi-consistent ETC, GA-MinMin is worse than GA-
Sufferage, but the differences in the results are minor. In the
case of makespan the efficiencies of the GA-MinMin and
GA-Sufferage are at the same level.
The best values of average resource utilization metric
were obtained by GA-MinMin in all instances of inconsistent
ETC matrices. It is interesting to observe that the same meta-
heuristic (i.e. GA-MinMin) gives also the worst results in
resource utilization, in the case of consistent ETC matrices,
where GA-Sufferage is the best in the case of low, and GA-
MaxMin – in the case of high heterogeneity of resources. For
semi-consistent ETC the best results for all but one instances
are achieved by GA-MaxMin.
Most of the values of standard deviation (s.d.) are in the
range of 0.8-10 %, which means that the proposed method
should be improved in the future research to make the whole
scheduling process more stable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented a two level Stackelberg
game for modelling asymmetric users’ behavior in Grid
scheduling scenario. One user plays a Leader role on the
first level. He is responsible for computing a planning of
a large fraction of the tasks in the batch. The rest of the
players, called Followers, act on the second level. They try
to select the best strategy for the assignments of their tasks
subject to Leader’s strategy.
We defined this Stackelberg game as a hierarchical op-
timization problem solved by Genetic Algorithms (GAs) at
Leader’s level and by ad-hoc heuristics at Followers’ level.
The results of the experimental study showed that the pro-
posed approach achieved high values of the utilization met-
ric. The best resource utilization values have been achieved
by the GA-MinMin metaheuristic for the inconsistent ETC
matrices. On the other hand, regarding the makespan and
flowtime values we observed that in both cases it is GA-
MaxMin which achieved the worst values. In the case
of flowtime the best results are usually achieved by GA-
MinMin. Finally we also noticed that values of makespan
and flowtime are somehow worse than those reached by
some GA-based schedulers in the case of just task execution
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Table II
COMPARISON THE AVERAGE VALUES OF RESOURCE UTILIZATION, MAKESPAN AND FLOWTIME ACHIEVED BY THREE HYBRID META-HEURISTICS (IN
ARBITRARY TIME UNITS; s.d. - STANDARD DEVIATION)
Average Resource Utilization (±s.d.) Average Makespan (±s.d.) Average Flowtime (±s.d. )
Instance GA-MinMin Ga-MaxMin GA-Sufferage GA-MinMin Ga-MaxMin GA-Sufferage GA-MinMin Ga-MaxMin GA-Sufferage
u c hihi 0.952 0.9714 0.9750 8094910 8379870 8289200 1102560000 1171190000 1138430000
(±0.0953) (± 0.0345) (±0.0262) (±600034) (± 697710) (±631202) (±62551800) (± 108789000) (±95274900)
u c hilo 0.804 0.9726 0.9646 178408 163439 163488 29851300 29901800 29702500
(±0.1488) (±0.0653) (±0.0979) (±18836.8) (±6533.07) (±10846.7) (±1855790) (±1572700) (±1761150)
u c lohi 0.9620 0.9746 0.9747 262745 274184 273984 3661260 3886100 38464000
(±0.0975) (±0.0354) (±0.0333) (±19323.2) (±21665.6) (±24492.3) (±1662420) (±4060500) (±4362160)
u c lolo 0.7995 0.9746 0.9711 6025.39 5508.65 5490.56 994443 997411 991400
(±0.163233) (±0.0572) (±0.0671) (±770.943) (±251.945) (±240.11) (±51414.6) (±56050.1) (±34862.6)
u i hihi 0.9880 0.9878 0.987162 3543020 3579800 3601000 433603000 442345000 443630000
(±0.0264) (±0.0385) (± 0.0382) (±703298) (±1102800) (±888645) (±108287000) (±190414000) (±148015000)
u i hilo 0.9967 0.9964 0.9956 79438.2 79499.7 79246.2 13340900 13406600 13348700
(±0.0065) (±0.0085) (±0.0082) (±4562.55) (±4173.97) (±3295.87) (±749330) (±894854) (±680981)
u i lohi 0.9895 0.987174 0.9884 126202 126349 125665 15400900 15642300 15401200
(±0.0276) (±0.0302) (±0.0339) (±21982.9) (±18348.6) (±24526.3) (±3503680) (±3324080) (±4401610)
u i lolo 0.9966 0.9955 0.9963 2752.27 2771.87 2757.03 465670 470380 467816
(±0.0089) (±0.0087) (±0.0081) (±133.731) (±149.972) (±168.561) (±25385.4) (±34978.7) (±32745.6)
u s hihi 0.9793 0.9781 0.9758 4710420 4807480 4780570 598951000 603485000 596179000
(±0.0285) (±0.0307) (±0.0593) (±578839) (±663325) (±853673) (±105362000) (±126013000) (±134002000)
u s hilo 0.9759 0.9875 0.9856 103358 103073 102822 17558200 17737500 17576400
(±0.0689) (±0.0201) (±0.0283) (±7.448.58) (±4526.48) (±6191.47) (±1244710) (±1078820) (±1157260)
u s lohi 0.9763 0.9772 0.9683 143175 144396 151477 18041500 18301600 19184900
(±0.0604) (±0.0413) (±0.0617) (±37307.5) (±44480.9) (±53702.9) (±4981350) (±6657510) (± 8207100)
u s lolo 0.9749 0.9851 0.9843 3711.72 3719.71 3703.41 636440 646408 640312
(±0.0741) (±0.0257) (±0.0250) (±276.094) (±279.368) (±218.364) (±37980.7) (±59455.7) (±43452.1)
cost as objective (see [Xhafa et al., 2007 a)]), but our
scenario is more realistic as it allows the introduction of
hierarchical levels in Grid architecture. In our future work
we will evaluate the proposed three meta-heuristics in a
dynamic setting using a Grid simulator [Xhafa et al., 2007
b)].
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